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ABSTRACT 
The paper develops a model of product differentiation in which the quality of a product may 
be negatively affected by the number of consumers buying it, as it is the case for any good affected 
by congestion. It is shown that for any positive degree of heterogeneity among the consumers, a 
monopolist will always find it more profitable to differentiate, i.e., to sell more than one quality of 
the product at different prices. 
THE OPTIMAL PRODUCT-MIX FOR A MONOPOLIST IN THE PRESENCE 
OF CONGESTION EFFECT: A MODEL AND SOME RESULTS
Parkash Chander "' and Luc Leruth ** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The pricing problem of a monopolist producing several qualities of a good has received 
some theoretical attention in recent years. Mussa and Rosen (1978) analyze the optimal
product-mix for a monopolist offering several qualities of a product to heterogeneous consumers 
differentiated by their preference for quality. Itoh (1983) studies the welfare aspects of such
monopolistic behavior. Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982) show that the
degree of heterogeneity among the consumers detetmines the number of fitms which can make 
positive profits on the market. More recently, Gabszewicz, et.al. (1986) derives a condition on the
degree of heterogeneity leading to the existence of a "natural" monopolist whose profit maximizing 
policy is to sell the highest quality of his product only. Product differentiation thus disappears. 
Though these papers differ from each other in several respects, there is one assumption 
common to them, viz. the qualities of the product are exogenously given: They do not depend either 
on the prices being charged or on the number of consumers buying them. 
In this paper, we study the best strategy for a monopolist selling a commodity characterized 
by the fact that the utility a consumer derives from it is negatively affected by the number of other 
consumers who also buy it. For example, in Paris, each train in the subway has one coach painted in 
a special color (but otherwise identical to any other coach) to which only those people who bought a 
more expensive ticket have access. As a result, these coaches are less crowded, which is why some 
consumers are willing to pay the extra fee. 
Congestion effects have been studied in the theory of clubs or in a general equilibrium 
framework (see Marchand (1968) and Levy-Lambert (1968)), but less so in industrial organization,
if one excepts Wilson (1986) for the case of electricity supply. In this paper, we show that a
monopolist selling a good the quality of which is affected by the number of consumers who buy it, 
will always choose to differentiate as long as there is a positive degree of heterogeneity among the 
consumers. 
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In Section II we introduce the model. The main result is derived in Section III. Section IV 
is devoted to some conclusions. 
II. THE MODEL
We consider a single firm selling at most m distinct, substitute, goods labelled by an index 
i = 1, 2, . . , m. It is assumed that the quality level of each good can be represented by a real
number. The firm sets the prices for these goods and each consumer buys none or just one unit of 
one of the goods. 
We assume that each consumer can be characterized by a parameter 0 which represents his
preference for quality and that the consumers are distributed according to a function f (0) which is
- -
nonnegative, differenti�ble, and integrable over a certain interval [�,0],� < 0,�;::: 0, such that
f (0) = 0 for all 0 � [0,0].
As in Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Itoh (1982), we assume that a consumer 0 who buys one
unit of a good of quality k at a price p derives a surplus given by
S(0;k,p ) =0k -p. (1) 
Letp i.P2, ... , Pm and k1.k2 • . . .  , km be some prices and qualities of these goods.
Suppose p 1 > P2 > · · · >Pm and k1 > k2 > · · · >km. Suppose each consumer chooses among the
goods so as to maximize its surplus as defined by (1). 
and 
Define m numbers 01, . .  , 0m as
Pi- Pi+l . 0j= k k ,j=l, . . .  ,m-1, j - j +l
If the prices and qualities are related in such a way that 0 ;::: el > e2 > . . . > em ;::: �· then the
consumers belonging to [e i ,e i _ i] will choose to buy ki at price pi . Their number is given by
, a, _ , ni = Je f ( e) d0.J 
However, if 0;::: e1 > 02 > · · · > em � 0 is not true, then some of the qualities will not be
bought. A representation is given in Figure 1 for the case m = 3. The three lines S 1, S 2 and S 3 give
the surplus which would be enjoyed by each consumer in each case and the thick line represents the 
surplus derived from the actual choice. Note that if 0 prefers k; to k; + i. then 0' > 0 will also prefer
k; to k; + 1 • 
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Let k be a real valued function having the following properties: 
(i) k is at least twice differentiable; 
(ii) k (r)>Oand dk (r)l dr <Ofor all r �O; and 
(iii) k (0) < + oo, 
s1 
I $2 I 
, s3 
I 
:> 
e a 1 
We shall assume that if nj is the number of consumers buying good j, then kj = k ( nj) is its quality.
A good example is provided by the transport network in New Delhi. There are two sorts of 
buses differentiated only by the price of the ticket, which is announced on the window ( 2 Rs. or 1 
Re. ). The people at the stand consider the levels of congestion before getting in or not. The system 
is working quite well with the 2 Rs. buses obviously less crowded than the 1 Re. ones. 
At this stage, it is worth noticing that if quality were not affected by congestion, consumers 
would simply not buy a good i which is of lower quality and higher price than another one. But in 
our model, by buying another good in place of good i , the consumers decrease the congestion in 
good i , which increases its quality k;. Thus, after a certain number of consumers withdraw from 
buying good i , it might be the case that k; will rise enough to prevent the remaining consumers 
from withdrawing. Notice that a good which is not bought at all must have the highest quality and 
price. 
Letp i.P2, ... , Pm be some given prices of them goods. Suppose an equilibrium is
achieved in the sense that everybody has made a choice and does not want to change it, given what 
the other consumers have chosen. Let k1, . . . , km be the resultant qualities.
Proof: Suppose it is not true. Then there is some i and j for which Pi � Pj and k; > kj. But this
cannot happen because the consumers who had chosen j would prefer i . Thus they will shift until 
k; �kj.
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Hereafter we call a set of prices p 1, ... , Pm such that p 1 � p 2 � · · · �Pm a price vector p - � 
and a set of a' s 'a1, ... , am such that a� al � ... � am �a, a partition vector a. The existence of 
an equilibrium is detennined by the ability of a price vector/! to induce a partition (possibly unique)
� 
vector a. 
� 
Let us now consider all the partition vectors a which are such that
(a) a1 s a 
r e Ia, Ia I (b) .la/ (a) d as ei f (a) d as .. · s a..
.. - f (a) d a
(c) am��. 
� 
The first two conditions ensure that the vector a is relevant to our analysis, but the third one may
appear to be restrictive. However, we shall later show why condition (c) is justified. Also notice 
that the possibility of a; =a; _ 1 = · · · = a1 =a for some i s m is not being ruled out.
� 
Let e be the set of all vectors a verifying the above conditions. Then E> is clearly compact
and simply connected. 
� 
Proposition 2; For any a in E>, there is one and only one price vector p sustaining it, i.e., such that
� 
given p the consumers maximize their surplus by making their choices according to a . 
Proof Define p =(pl• ... ,pm) as
re ra, Pi -pz = a1[k(Ja/(a)da)- k(Ja2 f (a)da)]
i
a, 
i
a2 Pz -p3 = az[k( 9i f (a) da) -k( � f (a) da)]
a 
Pm = am kcfa .,_,! (a)da).. 
� 
Then p is the unique price vector that sustains a. Notice that p 1 � p 2 � · · · �Pm 
and k1  � kz � · · · �km, where
k; = k ( t�i - If (a) d a) .
I 
� 
Given e, let P be the set of all price vectors which correspond to some a in E>. Then P
includes all the price vectors which are relevant to a monopolist's strategy. 
� 
(2) 
It is worth clarifying that if a were such that am S �· then the sustaining price vector cannot
be unique. Indeed the last equation of (2) disappears and we have a system of (m - 1) equations to
� 
determine m prices. Such a vector a could be sustained by a vector of prices p as well as by all
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price vectors p - !:.p where !:.j/ = (!:.p , !:.p, . . . , !:.p ), !:.p > 0. This can be derived from (2) and is
illustrated in Figure 2. Note that when em < �· the consumer characterized by � has a positive 
surplus. It is therefore possible to increase all the prices in such a way that em � � and equalities (2)
are satisfied. Since a monopolist, given the choice, will always charge higher prices, our assumption 
--+ 
that e should be such that em � � is justified (see (c) above).
, ... 
$ 
' -­
--
-- �--- _,,..,.. I ,,..,.. 
Figure 2 
·G 1
It may also be observed that two or more goods may have the same quality and prices. In
--+ 
such cases the consumers may choose between the goods either randomly or according toe. From 
the point of view of profits of the finn, however, it does not matter how the consumers choose 
--+ 
between such goods. Hence it is assumed that they choose according to e . 
--+ 
Proposition 3: If p e P , then there is one and only one partition e e 9 which can be sustained by it.
--+ 
Proof: Since p e P , there exists by definition a e e 9 such that equalities (2) above are satisfied.
-+ �f I I 
We show that 0 is unique. Suppose not. Suppose e = (e1 , ... , em)'# (e1, . . . , 0m) also satisfies 
(2). Let (k 1, . • .  , km) and (k;, ... , k�) be the corresponding qualities. Without loss of generality
assume that e; > 01• Then we must have
k; = k d0� f (0) de) > k d0� f (0) d 0) = k 1 .
The first equation in (2) then implies e� > 0z. The process goes on until we reach e� > em and 
0' 0 k� = k(Lm-l/(e)de)>kd0 n-IJ(e)de)=km am .. 
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But this cannot be true, since we must have 
If 0� = 01 , the process can start from the first 0j such that 0j -:t. 0} . And we shall again get a�, � 
contradiction unless 0 = 0. 
Proposition 4: (a) The set of all suitable partition vectors 9 and the set of all sustaining price
vectors P are homeomorphic and (b) P is simply connected. 
Proof: (a) There is a continuous bijection between 9 and P as a consequence of equation (2)
(continuity) and propositions (2) and (3) (bijection). Since 0 is a compact subspace of Rm and P is 
Hausdorff, the continuous bijection is a homeomorphism. (b) Since 9 is simply connected and 
simple connectedness is a topological property, P is simply connected. 
For m = 2, the simple connectedness of P implies that the set does not have any holes and is 
perfectly defined by its bounds. As a result, we can define P as 
P = {p =(p i.Pi> IP l �P2 ,pl �p l,max( P2). 
and P2 � P2 min( P i) , where pl max solves . . 
01( P1,max•P2 ) =0 and P2,min solves
An example is provided in Figure 3.
III. THE MONOPOLIST
I I 
I I 
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Fiqure 3 
We now show that, in order to maximize his profit, a monopolist will always set 
differentiated prices and thus, differentiated qualities. Without loss of generality, we consider the 
case of two goods only. 
Proposition 5: p 1 = p2 is never a profit-maximizing price policy if there is a positive degree of 
heterogeneity among consumers, i.e., 0 < 0. 
Proof: Profits are given by 
where 
re 101 1t = P1Je/(0) d0 +p2 92 /(0) d0 , (3) 
re 10, P i  - p2 = 0 i [k ( .le  /(0) d0) - k( 9 /(0) d0) ] (4) 
I 2 
and 
8 
r01 Pz = 0zk (J9 /(0)d 0) .2 
Therefore, 1t is a continuous function defined over the compact set E> . It must therefore attain its
� � 
maximum over some 0 E e. We prove that 0 must be such that p 1 '#-pz. We have
d 1t d 1t d1t = -dp1 + -dpz,dP1 dpz 
a1t re a01 [ a01 a02 ]
-a = J9 /(0)d 0- ptf(01) -a +pz /(01)-a--f(02)-a-'P1 1 'Pl 'Pl 'Pl 
d1t a01 1°1 [ a01 a02 ] -a- =  - ptf(01)-a- + 0 J(0)d 0 +pz /(01)-a--f(02)-a-'P2 'Pz 2 'Pz 'Pz 
Therefore, at p 1 = p 2 and dp 1 , dp 2 such that
we get 
a02 a02 d 02 = -a dp1 + -a dpz =O,'Pl 'Pz 
I la r� d1tl�=constant = dp1 a/ (0)d 0 +dpz J 92 /(0)d 0
since p 1 = p2 • Totally differentiating (4) and (5) and using (6), we get
and 
where 
dk [ a01 a01 Jdp1 -dp2 = -2 01 dn /(01) ap1 dp1 + dpzdpz 
dk2 I - - 1 dn2 IP1=P2
(5) 
(6) 
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Therefore, 
Since 01 > 02 , for dp2 < 0 we get dp 1 + dp2 > 0 and hence d1t > 0. This shows that if p 1 = p2,
then the prices can be adjusted in such a way that d 1t > 0. This completes the proof. 
Intuition: We start with a unique price p * ( = p 1 = p 2 )  for both goods and show that, for any p * ,
the monopolist can always increase his profit by decreasing p 2 and increasing p 1 in such a way
that 02 remains constant. By doing so, we make sure that the result will hold for any distribution of 
the 0's such that 0 < 0, no matter how narrow it is. Indeed, we know that the ratio p2/k2 must be
higher or equal to � and thus, the prices and qualities must be changed in such a way that p2/k2
would not go below 0 . 
From (p * ,p *) , we go to (pt, pi) = (p * ,p *) + (dp 1,dp 2) with (dp 1 + dp 2) such that 02
is constant as shown in Figure 3. By decreasing p2 and increasing p 1 , we change the qualities to
kt , k:f compared to the situation in which p 1 = p 2 = p * and k i* = k 1 = k * . See Figure 4. 
s 
Figure 4 
I 
I 
I (:it 
I 
I 
1-, e� 
By decreasing p2 and increasing p 1 , the monopolist gains B-A and the proof of proposition 5 
shows that B-A is positive. 
Finally, it may be interesting to note that we can also associate a planning problem with the 
above model. Suppose the firm is publicly owned and the Public Authority is interested in providing 
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the good at as low a price as possible by subsidizing upto a maximum amount of S. Formally, the 
problem of the Public Authority is to 
minimize p 2 , subject to
1t+s;;::o, 
where 
Proposition 5 shows that if p 1 = p 2 , then the prices can be adjusted such that dp 2 < O and d 1t > 0 
which implies that p 1 = p 2 cannot be a solution to the above problem. This shows that even from a
social point of view price differentiation may be necessary. 
IV. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING MODELS AND CONCLUSIONS
It has been assumed above that each of the goods irrespective of its quality can be produced 
at a constant unit variable cost ( marginal cost ) which for simplicity has been taken to be zero 
everywhere. Our results, however, do not depend upon this assumption. The same results would 
obtain even if the unit variable cost were rising with quality. 
In the analysis above we have also ignored fixed costs or taken them as sunk costs and the 
number of goods ( or qualities ) as exogenously given. If fixed costs were not sunk costs, then the 
number of goods offered by the monopolist will depend upon them. If fixed costs decline due to 
technological improvements, more goods of better quality will be offered. 
In a recent paper, Gabszewicz et.al. (1986) show that when consumers are not "too" 
heterogeneous, the monopolist has an incentive to sell his top quality only. The reason why it is so
is that prices can be so fixed that all prefer the top quality. Selling a lower one requires the
monopolist to charge such a low price that it would not be profitable. 
Above results show that this does not hold in a model in which quality is a function of the 
degree of congestion. The reason is that the top quality good can be sold very little or none at all at
the prices at which it is the top quality. Thus, the monopolist can never do anything else than selling 
below top quality if he wants to maximize his profits. And that gives him an incentive to 
differentiate. 
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